The Hooks Beneath the Bait

Entrapment and Escape in Althusser and Art

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"We understand why we have made certain moves only in retrospect, just as someone who has fallen into an ambush discovers the trap only after the fact." – Althusser, *On Content in the Thought of G. W. F. Hegel*

ABSTRACT

Francois Matheron has suggested that the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of providing a comprehensive assessment to the work of Louis Althusser results from the 'generalized uncertainty' of an oeuvre constructed in the "dimension of catastrophe" and *designed* by its author to be "forever destroying itself". This paper allows itself to fall into the trap — advised against by Warren Montag, because it would fail to recognize the "combined and uneven development" within his oeuvre — of treating Althusser's later writings on 'aleatory materialism' as containing 'double truths' or the esoteric secret and key to what he had been writing about all along. An apparently common mistake among enchanted readers, it is here made deliberately if only to install the analysis in an altogether different territory: that of the unavoidability of traps themselves. Therefore, a back-track through Althusser's 'theoretical mischief' is required that positions itself decidedly against certain critical perspectives that have sought to delegitimize his philosophical project on the basis of its operation through the deployment of ruses and deception.

Neither a comprehensive assessment nor a captivated mysticism, and not exactly the projection of Althusser's own form of 'symptomatic reading', what is offered instead—to borrow a term he adopted from Lacan in *For Marx*—is a 'scan' of its 'nodes, references, and shifts'. This paper wagers on a reversal of perspective away from his suture of philosophy and politics that might expose the 'affinity' and 'complementarity' of an encounter between his oeuvre and the Greek 'mental category' of mêtic intelligence. Neglected in the history of Western thought but arguably first retrieved from cultural amnesia by Jean-Pierre Vernant and Marcel Detienne in their 1974 book *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society,* and currently being theorized as a technological vector by Ben Singleton, mêtis is

said to occupy many different levels of human (and animal) intelligence, from the solving of enigmas and riddles, the skills of a carpenter, the navigation of ships at sea, to ruses, tricks, and deceits of all kind. Yet it rarely appears on the surface of texts or things but is rather set in an 'off stage' or 'backstage' within the world, and according to Detienne and Vernant, "must be tracked down elsewhere, in areas which the philosopher usually passes over in silence or mentions only with irony or with hostility". If for Althusser philosophy was the "pertinent index" from which to wage the struggle of 'class war in theory', it will be established that mêtis is the pertinent index from which to analyze and evaluate the practical effectiveness of his methodology or give any robust account of the cognitive technologies and weaponized concepts it made use of. With this in mind, the aim is to extract from mêtic intelligence as a form of rationality complicit with 'inhabiting the trap' some consequences bearing on the evasion of ideological capture through the practico-theoretic manipulation of forms and materials in political, philosophical, and artistic practices.

I. ENCLOSURE

The Althusserian philosophical scenographic of the aleatory might be briefly summarized as follows: the world is an accomplished fact, without Origin, Reason, Cause, or End. Capitalism, which may not have occurred at 13.798±0.037 billion years into a run-away contingency, in fact did. Resulting from an immemorial *swerve* of the atom, capitalism is a *lasting accomplishment,* persisting alongside every other existing, accomplished fact. The forms resulting from this swerve — a deviation whose conflation with 'freedom', Althusser remarked, would be a "splendid piece of nonsense" — represent a paradoxical 'reversal' from the primacy of elements over a structure, to the 'taking hold' of a structure that has become primary in relation to its elements. Arising after the hold has *taken* without a *mis*-take, and the rules and laws began to gel, capitalism's only necessity (its 'nature') is a modality of the contingency which gave rise to it, and resides solely in the reproduction of social relations and configurations that act as its material support. Ideology, another kind of 'accident', fuels like petrol the unconscious motor of individuals, molding them through subjection, while apparatuses also fueled by ideology conceal its operations and burn in the engine of the State, which releases them as a suffocating fog for use in the modulation and entrapment of its subjects without the possibility of a final escape.

No doubt a simplification and almost a caricature, this description can nonetheless be said to encapsulate particular affects that form a kind of existential backdrop in Althusser's oeuvre, corresponding in a number of ways to his deep pessimism. Referring to Camus in "The International of Decent Feelings" (his

earliest essay dating from 1946), Althusser found the philosophical and political conjuncture to be one where the only possible horizon was a wall whose seemingly impervious nature was to be greeted not by having one's back against it, which was 'a life for dogs' as Camus had put it, but combated by turning around to face it with the enigmatic non-consolation that *at least there was a horizon*. Nearly forty years later when Althusser found himself writing the book from which his now notorious essay "The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter" has been cut and stitched together, he lamented that instead of an empty world, or at least an empty space for thinking with clear orientation, it was rather a "unfortunate fact" that the world was full, and full of people pursuing the same goals, destructively coupling means to ends and bestowing death in order to forge their paths.[1] To deglaze this scorched pessimism with some socially incarcerating dread, Ettienne Balibar, in a recent commentary on the dramatization of ideology in Althusser's work, stated that from the perspective of a project aimed at the 'destabilization of Marxism from within' there could be no such thing as 'anarchic freedom'; it was only possible to move from one structural identification to the next in the perpetual confinement of ideologies which precede and determine our thoughts and actions.[2] Althusser does as much to say so himself in a 1986 letter to Fernanda Navarro, indicating that ideological interpellation — that circuit into which we are mobilized and compacted according to the logic of 'no subject left behind' — occurs in several dimensions at once, through multiple ideologies differing in both kind and level. The result of these interpellations are what Althusser phrased "a contradictory play and a space", which would constitute a 'subject-individual's' 'freedom' between positions, affording each a 'play of maneuver' where the individual may "determine his course, although this determination is itself determined, but in the play of the plurality of interpellations."[3]

Within this somewhat 'decisional structure'—which Althusser will insist contains non-deterministic determinations—this description of ideological manipulation (which cannot but be full of false alternatives) does not fail to seem like a kind of 'functionalist imprisonment'. It was Althusser's combat with the illusions of givenness circulating through ideology and the philosophical psychologism of phenomenal intentionality that prompted him to replace the Subject of History with historical development described as a 'process without a subject', substituting the words individual, and sometimes, agent or agency, for the category of the subject; a maneuver to which those who had lost their precious philosophical and political category would recuse him for theorizing an impotent functionalism. However if the category of the subject was jettisoned because it was an ideological category and presented an "epistemological obstacle", it was precisely because functionalism provided the operative structural-conceptual

integrity for effectively *acting against* an ideologically saturated field of *inoperative* notions such as 'freedom' or 'will'. Or as Balibar has put it in his essay "Althusser's Object", the constitution of the subject is its dissolution in action through continuous transformation, such that "[i]t is *in the process without a subject* that the 'constitution of a subject' can have meaning" [4]

Approached from this perspective, it is in the strategic positioning of oneself within networked ideological structures that the theory-practice doublet can be activated through the making of distinctions, since the task of recognizing the determination of one's determinations is already to begin drafting the cognitive maps of opposition. Yet this carving out of space, formulated topographically by Althusser as the perpetuation of epistemological breaks, does not open onto an outside of self-authoring 'freedoms', per se. And to the claim that philosophy has an outside, Althusser will reply in "The Transformation of Philosophy" as elsewhere that it does not, since, in its appropriation of the extra-philosophical, any exterior that it might lay claim to can only be produced as exterior from within itself, an outside produced and discovered as within a "theoretical laboratory"[5]. Althusser had formulated this problem somewhat differently in the pages of *Reading Capital,* where he remarked that "[i]t is impossible to leave a closed space simply by taking up a position merely *outside it*, either in its exterior or its profundity: so long as this outside or profundity remain *its* outside or profundity, they still belong to *that* circle, to *that* closed space, as its 'repetition' in *its* other-than-itself."[6] It would be useful to cite Warren Montag's brilliant recapitulation of this that appears in *Althusser and His Contemporaries,* where he says that

> *To imagine that it is possible to wage a struggle from the outside when there exists no outside, except an outside already inscribed within a given field as its outside, is thus to take up a position always inscribed within as a function of the order one would overturn. In this sense, one must operate necessarily from the interior, and the manner in which one inhabits this interior determines whether one can undermine and destabilize the conceptual order. To imagine the possibility of simply stepping outside or, as Althusser put it, of finding an empty corner of the forest, is to be condemned to repeat the very discourse with which one would break.[7]*

Given that Althusser considered the problems of philosophy analogous to those which could be observed taking place within class society[8] it would be worth

mentioning here in the context of these two quotes a recent article by Ray Brassier which critiqued both the 'exit thesis' of Jacques Camatte's 1973 *Wandering Humanity* and the present day theory of communization put forward by the anonymous collective Endnotes[9]. Briefly summarized we could say that with Camatte, capital's totalizing force inserts itself into the cybernetic matrix of human society, transforming individuals into a programmable mass while distorting, multiplying, and prolonging desires without ever providing their real fulfillment. It reinstalls an evacuated subjectivity for them in the 'generalized lunacy' of an indefinite movement that has run-away in the era of real subsumption, which transforms existing labor processes and forces subjects into the wage-relation, expropriating them through an indefatigable mechanism of "analyzing-dissecting-fragmenting the human being". In this scenario, all forms of labor are appropriated, modified, and made to participate in capital's developed autonomy and externalization, and all representation has been subsumed under capital, which has itself *become representation*. Consequently, an 'exit' from the era of real subsumption as suggested by Camatte is already rendered inoperative by capital, and as Brassier concludes, the aimed for exit functions through a thesis which posits an exterior that can only be *ideal.*

For Althusser, as indicated above, the individual's determinations are socially determined within the closed circuit of the class-relation expressed from the standpoint of ideology. Similarly for Endnotes, the 'we' of communization that might seek to form itself by and through an overcoming of the class-relation is itself already inscribed within and determined by that class-relation, such that any overcoming of the class-relation must simultaneously and paradoxically also be the overcoming and supersession of that very 'we'. To borrow a passage used by Brassier, Endnotes will say that "the 'we' of revolution does not affirm itself, does not identify itself positively, because it cannot; it cannot assert itself against the 'they' of capital without being confronted by the problem of its own existence" 'Communization' for Endnotes, then, would not therefore result from the determinations of individuals caught up in the class-relation but is interminable and *internal* as a movement that must confront capital at the level of its externalization and appropriate this mode of externalization 'without exit'. They will go on to say that "Communist theory thus has no need of an external, Archimedean point from which to take the measure of its object, and communization has no need of a transcendent standpoint of 'withdrawal' or 'secession' from which to launch its 'attack'."[10]

It should be acknowledged that the nature of the theoretical interventions of both Camatte and Endnotes compel them to flank Althusser with critique from either side. With Camatte, scientific discourse is deemed to be isomorphic with the discourse of capitalism. Consequently this renders Althusser's position—in

Camatte's eyes, that of grounding liberation on the capacities of the sciences (in the plural, for Althusser at least)—as nothing less than "insane" (but we know that Althusser was not quite well…). In their essay "Crisis in the Class Relation", Endnotes will position an assault on Althusser's "functionalist tendency" or that of any other Althusserian Marxism, which accordingly is said to take as a "metaphysical principle" the tautological self-replication of the social totality where the parts necessary for the persistence of the whole is nothing but the whole as the persistence of its parts.[11] But it might be asked, which Althusser is being described here, since he had mastered the 180 degree turn before there was ever a Zizek to complain about? *Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses* is in fact the *initial theory* of the 180 degree turn. The tautology deemed a 'trivial truth' by Endnotes is indeed something that Althusser, not threatening the throne of structuralism's vogue at the time it was theorized by him, would later reverse, more or less rejecting and attempting to remove as a tumor of the universalizing 'applied model';[12] the effect of fabricating a philosophy missing from Marx that was a necessary conjunctural deception played out as the "theoreticist" symptom of a speculative-rationalism[13]. As Althusser would say of Hegel's ruse in his thesis, "[o]ne has to put a good face on the defective content."[14]

Then there is also the analysis given to the history of subsumption by Endnotes concerning the global transition from formal subsumption's 'taking hold' of existing labor processes to their transformation under real subsumption, where they conclude the latter to be inoperative (or at least incomplete) as a periodizing tool, since as they say, real subsumption cannot but generate further formal subsumptions. If only by way of a slight distortion, a variant of this position can already be found in Althusser's *Lecture Course for the Scientists*. For if the term *subsumption* appears only very rarely in Althusser's texts, this is because its other name is *domination,* such that formal and real subsumption have their analogue in the philosophical and scientific struggle between idealism and materialism. Just as formal subsumption will continue to persist, so will idealism according to Althusser, "even after the Revolution."[15]

Where Brassier will insist that interventions into the conceptual order do not, for Marxists, make the stuff of revolutions[16], it can be remarked, perhaps thankfully, that Althusser was quite unlike most Marxists, since it was precisely this form of intervention which he sought to effectuate beginning from the hypothesis (which was to be empirically verified, if only in the surprise of events which were to be recaptured) that a transformation of the dominant ideologies could result in a transformation of the constellations of social practices which are subject to them. The material social practice Althusser found to be the most powerful manifestation of the dominant ideology, replacing even that of religion, was none other than the apparatus of education. However the collaborative

research project *Schools* that was undertaken with Etienne Balibar and gestured toward repeatedly in the recently published *On the Reproduction of Capitalism* in the end remained unfinished.

2. CONTROL AND MODULATION

While the notions of ideological interpellation and domination closely resemble the disciplinary societies of his former student Foucault, it was Althusser who can be said to have anticipated their 'general crises of enclosures' and the emerging horizon that signaled a transition to the 'societies of control' diagnosed by Deleuze. Already within the assembled fragments of *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,* Althusser had recognized the mutation through a 'tendential law' within the education system of varieties of 'know-how' accommodated to modes of re-skilling more suitable to the expediencies of profit. As Althusser would put it, a flow of training more and more away from apprenticeship, directed outside the realm of production itself into capitalist education systems and "other instances and institutions".[17] An extensive note from *On the Reproduction of Capitalism* that describes this problem in an elucidation of the implementation of 'know-how' is worth citing in its entirety

> *'Know-how'. This can mean simple* techniques *(knowing how to read, write, count, read a map, find one's way in a chronology, recognize this or that object or reality, and so on). But it can also mean 'knowledge', that is, the rudiments or elements (sometimes even relatively advance) of scientific learning (let us leave literature aside). We must here introduce a very important distinction. One does not learn 'science' at school, nor even at university, as a rule. One learns scientific results and methods of reasoning and demonstration. Basically, one learns to '*solve problems' or do* 'practical exercises'. *That is not, however, 'science', but, rather, elements of methodology and scientific results that constitute* by products *of living science. Living science exists, let us say, ins scientific research alone. (Lengthy commentaries could be made on that simple sentence.) To capture the difference in a phrase, let us say that the essence of living science consists less in solving problems that in* posing *the problems to be solved. Thus what one learns of science in schools and universities is techniques for manipulating and exploiting certain scientific results and methods completely detached from their 'real life'. That is why we can range all of the following under a single rubric: know-how; elementary techniques; and elements, even if they are relatively advanced, of scientific learning.[18]*

For Deleuze, this also meant the gradual abandonment of research following from an introduction at all levels of the corporation; co-extensive with the era of real subsumption this signaled for him a transition from 'always starting again' to 'never being finished with anything'. [19] Where mold or enclosure referred on the one hand to the striated space of maximal external force through discipline and domination, modulation on the other hand, as it was explicated by Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus*, referred to a smooth space incompatible with what societies might commonly be inclined to recognize as labor, work, or action (a cast or 'sieve' in continuous deformation as Deleuze would put in his "Postscript").[20] And for precisely this reason its operations are able to extract from the human population without it appearing as if anything were happening. Pierre Macherey described this, following Foucault, as "bending to the slope of a rationality that quietly goes to work".[21] For Deleuze and Guattarri, there are only linear forms of content relating to other forms of content, each with their corresponding form of expression (the sick, the delinquent, the ignorant…), such that the organizations of power are everywhere, and cannot be located within the apparatus of the State. To detour a phrase Althusser once used "one can catch anything in a net except the sea".[22] By now the list of consequences ought to appear as all too familiar: instances of so-called 'immaterial labor', the free labor of social networks, precarious labor, managerial capitalism's appropriation of neurosicentific rhetoric regarding the brain's "plasticity", data mining, privatization of the university, "applied" education to techno-scientific systems, etc. It is the interminable production of a generalized cognitive rape through a generalized subjection within a generalized mystification. If this can be said to delineate certain aspects of 'late capitalism' (a phrase which ought for many reasons to continue to waver within scare quotes), and if there is a means of combating this to which Althusser proves both compatible and indispensible, it would be what Ben Singleton is theorizing as a *generalized escapology*. As Singleton has succinctly put it, "in order to be free of a trap, it's of less use to the trapped to decide upon some holy condition of freedom than to understand how one is implicated in the mechanism of one's entrapment." [23]

However there is a first level to this that must immediately be acknowledged: any perceived successful attempt at removal from one trap conceals, through the illusion of its exterior, the placement of oneself into other traps. It is a principle of mêtis that the world is traps all the way up, and down. And it is never easily apparent just how deep the trap hole goes. For, in following Brassier's cutting up of Adorno and Horkheimer's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (a premier cadaver of critical theory if ever there was one), there is a general obliviousness to the manner in which cultural history is mediated by natural history, which includes "not only evolutionary biology but also geology and

cosmology".[24] This also seems to be a symptomatic blindspot of cultural theory and contemporary Marxism on the whole. There would however be at least some indication in Althusser's account of aleatory materialism to be found in "The Underground Current" that this position highlighted by Brassier was acknowledged through his insistence that cultural history is a contingent effect of cosmic effects. Viewed laterally, the grip of ideological enclosure — or it should rather be said, structural enclosure effected from within a contingent cosmological order — is projected in every direction through time and space, exhibiting the dimensions of what Reza Negarestani would call a 'regional cut': its isomorphy with the unconscious is a 'traumatic configuration' that cannot be separated from the "abyssal relation of the universe to itself".[25] Like the continuum of C.S. Peirce, the trap itself is "supermultitudinous".

3. METIS AND SELF-MODULATION, OR PHILOSOPHY'S WAR OF 'ALL AGAINST ALL'

The Fox knows many tricks, the hedgehog only one, but it is a famous one.

Although it has often been remarked that there is none to be found, if there is at all any theoretical indication of forms of *counter*-interpellation to be gleaned from Althusser's texts, it would hinge on the 'interpellating turn' itself which transforms a reversal of the molding and modulating operations of subjection into a *self*-modulation. This procedure, if read according to Althusser's theory of 'structural causality' (rather than simply being an artifact of academic gymnastics performing the routine of "philosophical unification") has a significant relationship to the role of 'secondary formations' or defense mechanisms that are prompted through an 'autonomous play' in a transitive causality (such as in the cybernetic effects of feedback).[26] If the social forces of subjection through interpellation and the corresponding control through modulation induce a kind of hysteria (or even as Althusser will put it in his "notes on a materialist theater", the "ever imminent possibility" of a madness[27]) these are psychological responses that have a capacity for being repurposed—a repurposing that might be the only real sense in which Deleuze and Guattari's slogan of "panic is creation" can be said to mean anything beyond a generalized "misunderstanding".[28] For what is at stake in the practice of psychoanalysis hinges on a point where, at least as far the *mischiefs* of an aetiology were concerned for Freud in his studies on hysteria, "everything depends on reinforcing the patient's nervous system in its capacity to resist."[29] The entire problem of life can be reduced to this very mechanism of defense if we recall that

especially for Foucault, the precarity and contingency of 'life' was nothing more than 'the set of forces which resist death'.

The Althusserian project is philosophy and politics pursued via the production of *theoretical ideologies* (the invention and intervention of normative construction) that distance themselves internally against the dominant ideology in order to defend and retaliate against it. "Writing so as not to die", as Maurice Blanchot famously put it – a statement that Althusser's 'theoretical mischief' within the discovery of 'theoretical practice' could translate perfectly as 'ideologize so as not to die'. That is to say, the only way to escape ideology, at least following Althusser's peculiar logic, would be to design better ideologies by way of better theoretical machines. One might as well make the most of their confinement. Accordingly, the significance of Machiavelli to Althusser as tactical and strategic figure needs to be acknowledged, since his reading of *The Prince* describes Machiavelli's eye as trained on "*self-defense and expansion*", which should immediately be assigned as the corollary to Spinoza's *conatus and extension,*[30] coupling the theoretical attempt at 'unification' to the confinement of political subjects operating a 'rejection of domination'. Yet even if for Althusser Machiavelli represented the philosophical and theoretical equal of Spinoza, it was nonetheless Spinoza who remained for him a figure of the rationalist philosopher *par excellence* and a 'supreme strategist' who

> *began by laying siege to the enemy's most vital and most heavily fortified point or rather placed himself there as if he were his own enemy and therefore not under suspicion himself of being the enemy, taking over the enemy's theoretical fortress and turning it against that enemy, as if one were to turn the cannons of a fortress against its occupants.*[31]

If the images assigned to metis by the Greeks were expressed by the circle, the bond, and the reversal,[32] it is by way of the latter we can recognize a principle of at work in Spinoza, where, according to Detienne and Vernant, "[t]he only way to triumph over an adversary endowed with is to turn its own weapons against it."[33] For Francois Jullien, whose *Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking* analyzes ancient Chinese texts on the art of war alongside Dettiene and Vernant and is also modeled after the work of Foucault, is also precisely suited to tactical self-modulation and the strategic placement of oneself in the position of the enemy: a successful engagement with the enemy is said to result from a successful understanding of the enemy through the formation of a 'bond' with their intelligence and a constant evolution in their presence.[34] Althusser would often

describe philosophy as 'besieged by the enemy', occasionally deploying the term 'reversal' that figures into his later theories of ideological interpellation, although in the end these 'turns' of a subject's determinations are defined as being "in fact encroachments, that is to say, positions gained on one's adversary."[35] The motivation would not be unlike Hegel's *Ich bin der Kampf* [I am the battle][36] where the reversal is simultaneously a turning back upon consciousness to attain 'knowledge of oneself as of an enemy'. As the 'war of all against all', philosophy was also for Althusser the impossibility of a peace and the manifestation of irresolvable internal contradictions embodied as the Kantian *Kampfplatz*[37]—a battlefield that plays out the "theoretical relation of force" and a 'laying seige' of opponents positions "in the thick of an already occupied world"[38].

Alain's statement that 'wars are myths become reality', which Althusser references in "The International of Decent Feelings", perhaps begs the following question: what myths can be said to take place on the battlefield of Althusser's philosophy? There are the opponents, the myths of 'absolute consciousness' or the 'pure' transcendental subject[39] and the myth of the image constructed around him which he would combat in his *Essays in Self-Criticism.* Already this philosophical war was in part conceived as the theoretical relation of force, but Force itself was also a myth for Althusser—epitomized in both his earliest and latest essay by atomic force as deterrent in the displaying of force so as to not make use of it, which manipulates the minds of the public into confusion, fear, and mass hysteria. Yet there are also the *wars of myth*, and in the pitting of idealism against materialism—an ancient dispute between the 'friends of Forms' and 'friends of the Earth'—the two 'poles' which Althusser will say exist only by way of one another and whose distinction "is the work of a philosopher", it is difficult not to see here played out on the vast moving stage of philosophy a dramatization of the Greek *Titanomachy,* in which the Olympian 'lovers of Forms' deployed techne and the 'absolute weapon' of metis to overthrow the materialist Titans. Althusser appears as something of a double agent here, at once utilizing the formalism inherent in the dark conceptual machinery of science and structuralist 'theoreticism' in order to 'destabilize Marxism from within', but also shifting the terrain to assault the Universalizing 'method' of structuralism from the point of view of the class struggle. As he would explain it in one of his late letters, "materialism is *the index of an exigency*, a sign that idealism has to be rejected — yet without breaking free, without being able to break free, of the speculary pair idealism/materialism; hence it is a sign, but, *at the same time, a trap"*.[40] This is all the more reason to think Althusser's methodology according to the logic of metis, since, in the bind of such a philosophical trap from which one would be unable to break free, as he would conclude elsewhere, "all the techniques of war, including looting and camouflage, are permissible".[41]

It would be useful here to consider mêtic intelligence according to the terms set out by Detienne and Vernant's reading of ancient Greek texts. For these authors, it indicates procedures that oscillate continually between opposing poles,[42]utilizing 'oblique' methods in situations that are shifting and ambiguous; situations that require 'feeling one's way', sometimes 'guesswork'. Given its polymorphous nature and the difficulty in isolating it, mêtis can only be described by Detienne and Vernant as a 'mental category' and not a concept. Mêtis is also associated with dolos and *technê*, tricks and lures, and the changing of forms. The Sophists already understood this form of rationality, and while this is not the philosophical alignment of a nominalist materialism such as Althusser's, philosophy is nonetheless said by him to proceed by playing "tricks"[43] through investigations that are never passive, since their practico-theoretic operations denote a synthetic process of knowledge that furnishes "*materials* which are then worked up into the *raw material* of a subsequent labor of transformation".[44] For 'technical' reasons, according to Althusser, philosophy is said to absorb social practices and deform them through 'disarticulation and rearticulation', 'decomposition and recomposition' or a "reordering".[45] And in the place of 'interdisciplinary' approaches, which Althusser considered to oscillate "between a vague spiritualism and technocratic positivism",[46] he will instead speak of a topological constitution of 'neighborhoods' and 'zones'.

It is these methodological operations described by Althusser in his *Lecture Course for Scientists* that bring philosophy to the problem of *application,* which itself is said to conceal the world of technology (although theoretical 'mechanisms' are not exactly those of 'application' in its strict sense, since this would have to then describe an exteriority which, as indicated above, would not exist for it). But this back-tracking can proceed further, because the world of technology takes us also to the question of the *apparatus*—that 'thoroughly heterogeneous set' as it was described by Foucault, composed of elements and their 'network of relations' which include still *other* apparatuses. This is why, in spite of it being a beginner's guide to technophobia, Giorgio Agamben's essay "What is an Apparatus?" nonetheless remains worthwhile, at least as far as etymology is concerned, for tracing Foucault's use of the term back to the Greek *Oikonomia* [defined simply here as 'management'[47]], translated to Latin as *disposition,* from which has been derived the French *dispositif.* The 'silent dialogue' that can be said to have taken place between Althusser and Foucault in their published works concerning the term 'apparatus' can be left to one side, except to say that quite obviously for both of them, the functioning of an apparatus rests largely in its capacity to control a population through the manipulation of language. For Agamben, language is said to be "that most ancient of apparatuses—one in which thousands and thousands of years ago a primate inadvertently let himself be captured, probably without

realizing the consequences that he was about to face."[48] In the interzone mind of William Burroughs, words were the 'primary instrument' of control, to be met with either acquiescence or resistance. But words for Althusser were also potential revolutionary weapons to be appropriated, deformed, rearticulated, reordered, and re-inserted as "composite expressions" into the smallest fissures in the ideological 'cement'. From the perspective of Francois Jullien, the efficacy or effectiveness of a strategy rests in part on its capacity to form (or find) a fissure in the enemy's defense that could, through indirect means, be manipulated into becoming a crack and further widened into a caesura. Such 'modulation of the terrain' is exemplified in scientific and philosophical theory with the fabrication of concepts (linguistic engineering or mathematical formalization) through processes of deformation, transformation and repurposing. This is at least one way of approaching the problem of understanding the imperative of 'reconstituting the epistemological break', and might allow for a line of affinity to be drawn from the profound link that Detienne and Vernant see between mêtis and metallurgy in Greek thought with the composite metal bronze[49] to Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus,* where the blacksmith's manipulations pose dynamics which utilize tendencies in far from equilibrium systems, with the claim that such technical operations eschew the form-matter/ideal-material distinction. is also an 'indirect' use of force concerning tendencies, seeking advantage through the switching of paths or the alternation of trajectories—a *mēkhanē* or a manoeuvre Detienne and Vernant describe as a 'swerving'[50] that invests its potential in disarray, panic, or the simulation of thoughtlessness or madness[51] ('panic is creation' again).

But if the swerve cannot for Althusser be counted as a freedom in its strong sense as a pure autonomy, relating instead to determinations from within determined positions, it might instead be explained as the functional seizing of a tendency, or the shifting nature of the mobile point or position ascribed to the figurative 'space' of the political in *Machiavelli and Us. The Prince* was considered by Althusser to be a 'great snare' inserted into history and ideology; a protractive Trojan Horse of political theory that captures readers. The favored animal representing mêtic intelligence alongside the polymorphous behavior of the Octopus is the Fox, who appears as the political mascot *par excellence* in *Machiavelli and Us,* since "to be a fox is to be the *master of fraud* — both the fraud played on you, so that you can recognize its traps, and the fraud you must be able to perform, so as to entrap others. It is to be the master of guile and deception — not only in acts of war, traps, feints, and so on, but in the government of men generally."[52] It allows one to 'get around' people, to exercise a 'non-violent violence'.[53] As the art of anticipation, or a deviation from the terrain of an accomplished fact toward the protended theoretical apprehension of "*a fact to be accomplished"*, deception and escapology enable the turning of interpellation to be

reconfigured as a 'turning out' of a subject-position, or a cut from the world as it exists.[54] It would take the cold razor of a particular form of rationality to adjust itself according to the theoretical topography through an analysis of the terrain as a configuration. In the composite vocabulary, the 'invention' or occupation of a new 'theoretical territory' (Althusser) also requires engineering methods of *detection* in which an opportunity within a tendential 'setting in motion that has already begun' is seized so as to manipulate what is not yet 'patently visible'(Jullien).[55]

For Althusser, such transformations of intelligibility through visibility required a commitment to philosophical materialism, since from the position of empiricism alone philosophy was said to be "incapable of explaining the appearance of new objects in the field of 'the seen', and thus the fact that these new objects were not 'seen' earlier".[56] Accordingly, empiricism cannot adequately explain the posing of problems or their transformation, which science's predatory augmentation of cognition, operating in the dark or dimly lit passageways of structure, is purported to grasp by way of formalization through an "*apparatus* of theoretical vision".[57] This same logic is at work in *Reading Capital,* where the field of the invisible is described as the effect of visibility's structure, where an internal exteriority is carved out (following Foucault's 'inner darkness of exclusion')[58], such that extracting objects or tendencies also involves a change of both terrain and horizon played out according to the risks of a 'symptomatic reading' that is *"the action of a real drama"[59]* because of its complicity with what Macherey referred to as the "booby-trapped game of analysis".[60] As such, deceits, reversals, and camouflage are only some of the means with which an investigation stages its 'interventions' in order to disappear into them, like Marx's tailor who disappears into the costume, or the geometer into the circle that is traced ('the accountant is nowhere to be found in the account'…). The theoretical appropriation of psychoanalytic procedures, which have to "resort to unprecedented practical ruses to succeed",[61] turns philosophy's political meddling into a game of masks and disguises that manipulates its way into ideology's enclave from 'upstream'. In this sense, when Jullien considers the step by step observations that reveal the secret propensities of a terrain, the factors of its climate and topography, the prestidigitations and subtle gestures that dislodge an object which is already set to 'move all on its own' through the scrutiny of a situation where it is never given in advance precisely how one might 'win the day', it is almost as if he were describing not the Chinese art of war, but the analytic act.[62]

If the ruses, tricks, and disguises endorsed and utilized by Althusserian methods also describe philosophy as a kind of theater, it would have to be a Brechtian, Chinese inspired theater that achieves its alienation or estrangement-effect by the actor who looks at himself, but also at the audience. Brecht will say that in this way the Chinese actor, through a separation of gesture and mimicry that

does not 'disturb the illusion', undermines Western theater's adherence to the model of an actor that undergoes 'complete transformation'. To many of Althusser's critics however, much of his philosophy might just appear like what Brecht described as a "badly beaten-up mimicry, a commodity quickly thrown together for sale in the dark to customers who are in a hurry." [63] But as Balibar has stated, for someone who may have hated authorship even more than Foucault, Althusser was less of an author than he was a stage director within philosophy, turning away from philosophical heroism toward the fabrication of 'little theoretical theaters'. The importance of Brecht and his methods to Althusser's entire project have not been overlooked, but if read according to the principles of Chinese theater Althusser's *Essays in Self-Criticism* seem to take on a whole new meaning. This is why an account of the significance of Althusser for 20th century philosophy and political theory (and how it might impact the future of thinking) should take note of the distinctions he makes between production and discovery within theory, visible epistemological objects which concealed others, and his focus on the problems surrounding the gap between the object of knowledge and the real object, a gap which can be occupied that Matheron has dubbed in a recent essay "the impure purity of the Concept". However, within this essay there is a conclusion that Matheron still does not exactly risk saying, although he provides the components. That is, if as Matheron suggests, *Machiavelli and Us* is derived from a lecture course which was more about art than knowledge, if he always wrote from under 'the regime of the impurity of the concept', and if as Althusser himself has said, Machiavelli perhaps fascinated him more than any other figure because he recognized, even if in a delirium, his own thought and his own theoretical problems, we can perhaps derive an entire arsenal of methods directly related to those of art that help to make visible an ineliminable bond between the production of art and the production of knowledge—even if these two modes of thought remain irreducible to each other.

4. ART AND THE OPERATION OF REVERSAL

An evaluation of art's armamentarium should be approached from the distinctions Althusser sets up between art, science and ideology. Science is said to produce knowledge 'in the strict sense' by way of concepts, while art is said to be 'not ranked among the ideologies', that it produces instead of knowledge proper 'knowledge effects' or 'ideological effects' by way of modifying and presenting what can be 'seen', 'felt', or 'perceived'. It is probably not for nothing that his former student Alain Badiou would, after publishing two novels, devote himself to Althusser's remarks on art, science, and ideology in his first philosophical essay,

"The Autonomy of the Aesthetic Process" written in 1965. There, Badiou would attempt to theorize the artist (or author) not in terms of a creative subjectivity, but as a topological concept, a place or point of view mobilizing 'operators of transformation'. For Badiou this process 'is not a reflection of the real' but rather 'the real of the reflection' since "[i]t produces the imaginary reality of that which science appropriates in its real reality."[64] In what will later become Badiou's characteristic overturning of Wittgenstein through the ethical imperative to speak where we are expected to remain silent, through the operations of art, "ideology speaks of that whereof *it cannot speak* as ideology".[65] Art is considered as an 'alien material' at the heart of ideology and for Badiou it is a double articulation: a mode of production with an effect of signification and an effect of presence regionally producing a scission whose local manifestation can potentially impact the global structuring configuration. However, this operation itself is not said to constitute an art. Instead, what is termed an 'aesthetic mode of production' is "traversal to the classification of the arts"—a 'regional autonomy' described as a vectorial and oriented 'field' linked to the formation and deformation of 'aesthetic generalities'. Deformation should be understood here with the definition provided by Althusser in his essay on the Italian painter Cremonini, where it refers to a 'determinate absence of form' detached from subjectivity and expression that is set in opposition to deformity, which is considered to be merely the 'expressionistic' variant of an ideological category.[66] In his later *Inaesthetics,* what Badiou will call an 'artistic configuration' is conceptualized in a similar manner as 'aesthetic generalities' by way this time of generic multiplicity that would be neither a form, genre, period, or 'technical dispositif'. But its genericity is also susceptible to being 'overworked' or formalized to the extent of saturation and obsolescence.[67] Equally, however, the 'artistic configuration' is said to simultaneously remain open to operational seizing and re-activation in "times of uncertainty" from within a set of coordinates and constellations which shift according to the determination of a subject that occupies them. This leads to the question of what we are to precisely understand by the term "operation"?

Suffice to say that so far "operation" has been left undefined in much the same way that Althusser never precisely defines 'mechanism' when relentlessly deploying it. But it should at least be subtracted from the kinds of methods that are made use of through 'know-how', which, as Althusser vehemently insists, are related to the solving of problems ('application') and neglect the methodological operations specific to the generating of problems themselves ('living science'). The practico-theoretic architecture of an operation is thoroughly , and does not rely on the specificity of 'know-how', since the evolution and implementation of forms of 'know-how' is instead what results from it, but is by no means its 'goal'. A kind of supplement to what is being explored here in terms of "operation" can be found in

the work of Lorenzo Magnani, who extends the work of C.S. Peirce on abductive cognition in terms of its manipulative capacities.[68] Pierre Macherey has provided a remarkable version of this in his essay "Philosophy as Operation", and while it does not make mention of Althusser, his presence in the text is easily apparent. In opposition to the goal oriented operation of poietics (i.e. 'to build a house'), Macherey argues that the operation is a means without end "inserted into a process"[69] negatively returning to itself through the feedback of an overall movement that forces a point of view, a perspective, and a position. He perfectly describes Althusser's 'process without a subject' as that which "produces itself rather than being produced, inside the movement that determines it, in relation to the totality of its conditions."[70] Here nothing is either "prefigured" or "pre-established", and to operate is said in the same sense in which one makes commitments, which means without guarantees through a displacement of limits rather than their acceptance as given."[71] As Macherey goes on to say, "to operate is to take risks, including the risk of making a mistake."[72] This is why the operation cannot be conflated with 'know-how' or 'application', since these would require an intervention from an exterior position predicated on knowing in advance the terrain one is going to enter along with the solution one would seek. Instead, the components of an operation can be located in Macherey's formulation where the operation is said to be "simultaneously a diversion and a detour, [where] no *a priori* form of correctness directs it; instead, a ruse of reason is at work in it, a ruse so conducted that one knows neither who leads it nor who is led by it." [73]

While such an operation is figured by Macherey to depend on an internal negativity, it should be noted that the determinations unfold through an unlimited series, that is, a plurality, an infinite positivity. If for Althusser philosophy's motor is the void—illustrated by the nothingness created through a procedure of theoretical analytic distinction and materialist political division as the 'emptiness of a distance taken' (which is nothing more than the 'mere fact of being divided')—he nonetheless paradoxically sides with Deleuze in assigning to this void an ontological primacy of positivity over negativity. For the void's other name is infinity, and as Macherey will say elsewhere of Pascal, whom he insists does not really say anything different from what was said by Spinoza, "[w]hether one calls this infinity full or empty is, after all, merely a question of the name one chooses to give it, and has no bearing on the content of the reasoning that name designates."[74] This could be recast in Althusser's problematic as that which it is a matter of producing and discovering within thought through the determination of an empty space, seized from within a space that is already occupied and determined on the ideological terrain. The entire tension resides between the 'freedom', 'autonomy', or solitude one would seek—a solitude Spinoza says no one can stand because of fear[75]—and the clamor of social existence that prevents it.

Escaping the state proceeds as a 'mimetic phenomena' where "the requisite task is simultaneously an impossible task; what is to be warded off is what is to be established" (matheron)[76] Which is just to say that the Universal can only arise through the particular, the global from the local. Communism meets Lonerism. The Althusserian formula of 'occupying the gap'—which is not very different from the occupation of traps—posits philosophy everywhere (just as with the trap is everywhere), binding Spinoza's "men think" with Gramsci's 'everyone is a philosopher' in the infinite production of knowledges in every practice. And as Balibar concludes on this point, philosophy is fundamentally nothing else but thinking within and between practices.[77] In his analysis of the operation, Macherey sums this up perfectly when he says that

> *every practice is philosophical, or in relation with philosophical ulterior motives, which strives to go beyond the goals that directly inspire it, in order to reflect the global content and universal requisites that inevitably put its simplest procedures into play. In every practice, philosophy is that which incites it to think about itself, not in terms of a pre-established knowledge, but by relying on the development of its own operations, in so far as the latter are all, in their way, images of the absolute.[78]*

4.1 DOUBLING BACK

Cut, turn, detour, deviation, swerve, reversal…The operation that returns to itself is also the one that cuts back into itself to produce a double through this very mechanism of cognition. Doubling through the operation has been explored by Macherey in the essay "For a Theory of Literary Reproduction", where he discerns a theatre of doubles in Borges "Pierre Menard, Author of *Don Quixote*" produced through an "infinitesimal and infinite discrepancy".[79] Recalling Althusser's 'mere fact of being divided', it is a kind of 'dissociating operation' or 'dazzle camouflage' and estrangement procedure where the production of a work is described as having "a relationship of self-citation regarding itself". The notions of 'self-citation' and reversal can also be gleaned from the mathematician and philosopher Fernando Zalamea's *Synthetic Philosophy of Contemporary Mathematics,* which describes a 'relay' between art and science, wherein he borrows from Focillon a definition of art as 'forms that signify themselves' and extrapolates from Lautman an understanding of science as 'structures that form themselves'.[80] The latter self, as rational orientation of mathematics, deploys

technical transits, mobilities, extractions, maintained obstructions and contaminations, reversals and oscillations — operations which share the same neighborhoods of the 'regime of the impure' in which the only authentic form is a re-produced one that, according to Macherey, gets 'carried ahead of itself', deformed and reformed through variation.[81] The variation (doubling) produces a material remainder in the process of formalization that continually turns back to modify the form—this is why in Macherey it is a matter of both the 'redoubling' and a 'reversal'. A kind of internal displacement, the 'ideological effect' or 'knowledge effect' of art is said to be a 'confusion', an effect of the system.[82]Badiou also assigns reversal priority when he says that "[b]y aesthetic mode of production we understand the combination of factors whose effect is to operate the reversal. To operate the reversal means to give an ideological function to certain real-imaginary elements that are regionally produced by a historically determined state of the aesthetic process." There is scarcely any difference between this statements and that of Althusser's in his "Letter on Art" where he says that art and science are distinct from ideology, but this does not prevent their products from becoming elements of the ideological following their insertion into ideological circuits that consequently generates specific 'knowledge effects'.[83]

To regionally produce a redoubling and a reversal would then also seem to imply an operational seizure through a kind of cognitive Jiu-Jitsu grip (maximum efficacy, minimal effort, following Jullien) where cognition is able to take hold of these 'real-imaginary elements'. To wit, it is the function of engineering traps by analyzing the traps one is already implicated in. This is perhaps why the notion of both the hook and the grip are as important for Althusser as the concept of *deviation*. In "The Underground Current" tendencies and forms are said to emerge based upon a predisposition of all material elements to hook and be hooked-up, to be aligned and formed as an always contingent ensemble. And it is this 'fact of arrangement' that also provides the possibility of a counter-interpellation through the inception of a *Kairos* or time of opportunity that must be hooked and grabbed. According to Jullien, Kairos provides the link from which efficacy stems between the abstract and the concrete, and produces a set of evolutions from arrangement/measurement, mobility, to determination. [84] Interestingly the ambiguity in French of the word grip (*griffe*) carries a broad set of meanings. For Althusser, it not only denotes the contingent hold taken by elements in a situation, or the hold taken upon an interpellated individual, but as his translators indicate, the polysemy of *griffe* also commonly denotes a variety of tools used for clamping or clutching, as well as a stamped signature or even a tag identifying the designer or manufacturer of a garment.[85] Then there is also the Hegelian *Begriff,* the grip one takes upon a concept, where in Althusser's reading of Hegel, freedom itself appears in the mode of a *capture*, a concept, wherein one grasps the self.[86] It can

be understood as a kind of reversal of force, one that uses it indirectly. Such a mechanism of reversal is also to be found in Lyotard's *The Inhuman*, within a form of thinking that *turns back* to apprehend its material support as a hardware through which language or philosophy take hold to install themselves as an upgradeable, open-source software.[87] As Detienne and Vernant put it, the animal that is trapped can itself remain a trap.[88] This provides an escapological schema of continual transformation or variation by non-repetition, posed *in* the condition of traps, Althusser isolates in the very question of the *mechanism* of production in thought, and its operations set in opposition to the guarantees of a knowledge.[89] Practices become firmly established through their complicity with risk and a commitment to their consequences, and the new forms of thought this can enable.

Yet there is also no guarantee that this *will be* the case in every practice. As much as science, for example, has become tied to applications of techno-capitalist instrumentalization, works of art and artistic practices are also modulated from within the various enclosures that make possible the existence of the art world, enabling them to "enter into the open circuits of the bank" as Deleuze had it.[90] Suhail Malik and Andrea Phillips have argued that it is the collectors privative 'love of art' (as 'source of legitimacy' bound to empire making and capitalization) which enable the art market to epitomize financialization, and it is art's capitalization qua sabotage which is perfectly complimented by the Adornian-Beckettian-Battaillean instances of certain forms of contemporary art qua sabotage that insist on their own non-performativeness, uselessness, or failure.[91] Perhaps this now seemingly obvious, post-financial crisis fact is reason enough for justifying Malik's broader critical project, which is aimed at the destruction of contemporary art altogether, isolating it as a 'meta-genre of indetermination' entrapped in its own demand to be contemporary to itself, without either determinate content or form. According to the logic of his argument, contemporary art is a symptom rather than a site of freedom; it is about 'whatever' and for 'whomever', and because of this, fundamentally incapable of understanding its own temporality or its capacity to relate to time at all in its futurity. It is indeterminate because it's forms and meanings are to be determined by any-viewer-whoever, and its own logic is that of always being present to itself, such that 'contemporary art is what all art will be, right now, forever'. While the rigor of his argument is largely convincing and to be commended, it is also predicated on the negation of escape (and therefore of any escapology) in favor of affirming the imperative to destroy contemporary art and for art to exit contemporary art altogether. Malik's analysis of contemporary art would seem to follow the same logic of Endnotes, and falters precisely where it proposes the development of an 'exit strategy'—a thesis which is not unlike Camatte's in many respects, and just as Brassier's analysis of Camatte reveals, the result is merely ideal.

It is not possible to provide a full reproduction of Malik's position here, which would merit its own meta-critical investigation. However, if one is to make visible through critique the indeterminate non-identity of contemporary art, the powers of generalization ('determinate absence of form') and the kind of generic attributes of the contemporary artworld described by Malik need to be provisionally distinguished. In a rightfully well known formulation, Canguilheim had noted that the work done to a concept, which implied conferring upon it the function of a form, while exporting it *beyond* its region of origin, implied its generalization. But such generalization does not de facto lead to an indetermination. Zalamea has also considered the process of generalization as a *weapon of contrast* and a projection of abstract capacities onto 'concrete panoramas of impositions'.[92] Even with Whitehead the utmost abstractions were considered to be the true weapons with which to evaluate concrete fact. And while it is possible to theoretically generalize the operation of practice there is no 'general practice', only the singular 'case' of a particular 'cognitive appropriation' or 'mode of appropriation' (aesthetic, political, scientific…) for working through material transformations. Gabriel Catren has recently defined such modes of appropriation as *local and abstract modes of thought* that are universally-oriented, trans regional gradients refracted through the system of faculties.[93]Generalization, as 'weapon of contrast', is what enables one to seize concepts and modes of thought so as to synthetically navigate among them. Perhaps this is why if art is to be defined and deployed with a stake in its relation to future political and epistemological horizons, such a stereoscopic project ought to take place by radicalizing the surface of cognitive, material-formal abstractions engineered through the cognitive design of constraints developed from within each local position. But the lack of a current 'solution' to this problem is not precisely the point, which instead resides more in describing the conditions under which most art today is being made and isolating what it *does not* do. To say that it 'lacks determination' should be thought of as less a verdict than a call. This in itself needs to be absorbed by art if art is at all to determine what it *ought* to do when confronted with the choice between indetermination and myopic artworld or art market liberal 'freedoms'.

Destroying Contemporary Art, then, does not pose the scenario of art's elimination from any significant valence the fields of knowledge production, nor does it necessarily imply the destruction of the non-system that the artworld is purported to be. To put it in the terms of Jullien,"[i]t is not out of the goodness of your heart that you avoid massacring the enemy, but purely for the sake of efficacy. From the point of view of action, the objective of warfare is the destruction of the enemy, but from the point of view of a transformation, the

objective is a *deconstruction."[94]* The perspectives that constitute Althusser's understanding of action would also fit this description of occupying the point of view of transformation perfectly. It should be stressed that, even as Derrida knew (and in spite of the dirty name given to the word by way of him), deconstruction is never something *done* to something else, it is not a *performed* operation in the sense of something done to something else from the position of an exteriority. It is not the application of know-how. Although it may result from something performed, it is more from within the logics of engagement and modes of investigation, experiment, or careful analysis that the object or obstacle dis-articulates itself with little effort, in order that one might pass through (or around). The practico-theoretic machine of elimination does not necessarily imply destruction, but can instead refer to a specific procedure of 'handling'. Althusser explains this when describing the notion of an "epistemological obstacle" that he borrows from Bachelard. He states that

> *the metaphor of the epistemological obstacle signifies two things: (1) the theory comes up against an obstacle that prevents it from advancing; (2) this obstacle blocks a path and hides objects that are in some sense behind it. To eliminate the obstacle is to clear the path and perceive the objects that were hidden by it. Thus there is a twofold relationship between the obstacle and the path (or the objects): on the one hand, a relationship of opposition, but also, in a certain way, a relationship of correspondence which, albeit hard to define, is unmistakable. It is not just any obstacle that blocks just any path or 'hides' just any object. The history of theories shows that there is a certain relationship between the way of handling (eliminating) the obstacle and therefore the nature of the obstacle, on the one hand, and the path it blocks or the objects it 'hides' on the other.[95]*

If the artworld, or "contemporary art", are some of art's current epistemological obstacles preventing its retrieval as a viable form of multi-modal cognition, the one path that it is becoming more and more clear that they block is the one which leads toward thinking the future. It is either foreclosed, cancelled, or ridiculed as an ideological sickness. Or, worse still, handed over exclusively to the subtle manipulations of high finance and derivative markets. In such a situation, the destruction of contemporary art may not be the most optimal resolution. And, as Althusser put it, if it happens that something is destroyed it is simultaneously

reconstructed for a new configuration and a new structure that operates "on other foundations and in accordance with an altogether different plan."[96]

Some of the problems confronted over the course of this paper may have appeared to be obvious. However in knowing this at the outset the investigation was motivated by Althusser's provocation that "nothing is more difficult to break through or get around than the obvious".[97] Virilio insists that there are no pessimists, only realists and liars. But the realist would also have to be deceitful, and they would have to be a cheater; they would have to know full well that an exit from capitalism, ideology, and their determining structures is an idealist illusion generated by the system itself and that such systems can only be manipulated, rather than explicitly abandoned. For the world, as Althusser rightly observed, plays according to rules the way an honest player does, which means that it also plays with us.[98] This creates an image of ideology (or structure) as an insidious game of deception where the unsuspecting subjects produced by it are manipulated in the already doubly sick game of the cosmic joke that is human consciousness. The major contemporary problem then is the same one that for Althusser was 'the question of questions': not 'what are we to do?', as Endnotes would have it, but instead 'where are we going?'. Moreover, the materialist exigency of this later question presents itself here because it also happens that it is *already inscribed within the former as its condition of possibility*, since there can be no functionally coherent decisions ('*this* is what must be done…') without the 'piecewise' working through of orientation and navigation.

Exiting capitalism, or exiting the artworld of contemporary art altogether, remain ideal scenarios as far as practice is concerned. Any exit that does not involve death would still be inside of capitalism, and there is no escape except in the form of a future to be determined. The ship with which one sails (or on which they are a stowaway, or find to be the host of a rather unpleasant journey) is still stuck floating in the water that surrounds it. One could do better than to simply jump overboard given that the ocean, as it were, never ceases to confine one even on dry land. The trick then would be, as Nick Srnicek has recently phrased it (following Ben Singleton's platform logic) in defending the project of accelerationism, "to escape from one trap into a better one."[99] The future, with all of its risks and uncertainties, would be such a trap—it is the real invasion of an exteriority anticipated by the brain, and we cannot produce stable models for it, but can only approach it with a 'modeling intention' as it continually approaches us through a Ruse of Reason, lodging itself in the sediment of already existing tendencies. This is why for Althusser a memory is said to be the same as anticipation, it is the preserve of a previous tendency that ramifies the capacity of an opportunity or operational seizure.[100] As such it requires an abstract set of operative logics fueled by a specific form of rationality that can only be described

as either 'impure' or metic. And it must be stressed again that while is not (at least according to Detienne and Vernant) a concept, but a 'mental category', it is nonetheless what enables cognition to grasp and manipulate concepts in their transit from within the trap of a local and abstract mode of thought, and mobilize them 'beyond their region of origin'. in Greek mythology is also the one who "relates to the future seen from the point of view of its uncertainties".[101] It is the opposite of fixed and plotted paths, it is without guarantees.[102] It resides in the gap between thinking as the 'path that leads to the paths that lead nowhere' and the determining political fullness of the world. There may not be an exit, but there are heuristics, cheats, and tricks in the system, or forms of manipulation and escape that have yet to be engineered. Navigation then, in its broader sense, is performed according to the transit between diverse practices, which are 'taken up' or 'worked up' through material-ideal glueings (Zalamea) and transformations (Althusser). In keeping with one of Althusser's peculiar logics that was a deformation of both Hegel and Canguilhem into contradictory but conjoined twins, the future is disseminated in plots determined only in their retroaction.[103]Thinking the future and a possible future of art would seem to also require thinking within a capitalism that can itself be said to think us. The Greeks would speak of the grip of an expanse, a path which is also the infinity of a bond (aeiperon, without limit, circular). What Detienne and Vernant expressed as "the necessary complicity between the pilot and the element of the sea."[104]is not unlike the complicity of the subject-individual within ideology, whose agency Althusser finds in the plot-twist of theatrical counter-interpellating reversals that reveal a back stage of the determining structure (and immediately replicate another back stage in the very act of the pivot), indicating what, for Althusser "remains, however, an insurmountable externality: the theatre may be a traveling world, but this world is merely the dark stage on which one sets the scene in complicity with the night. The morning sun comes up over a deserted square." [105]

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1 "It is an unfortunate fact, however, that *this world is full* — full of people pursuing the

2 Audio file accessed June 15, 2014, http://blogs.newschool.edu/nssr-philosophy/2013/10/17/etienne-balibar-university-of-california-irvine-will-deliver-a-lecture-entitled-althussers-dramatization-of-ideology-some-recent-interpretations/

3 Althusser, *Philosophy of the Encounter,* 241.

4 Etienne Balibar, "Althusser's Object," in *Social Text,* No. 39 (Summer, 1994), 157-188.

5 Louis Althusser, *Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists,* ed. Gregory Elliot (London: Verso, 1990), 259.

6 Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, *Reading Capital,* trans. Ben Brewster (NLB, 1970), 53

[7] Warren Montag, *Althusser and His Contemporaries: Philosophy's Perpetual War* (Duke University Press, 2013), 6.

[8] Althusser, *Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists*, 261.

[9] Ray Brassier, "Wandering Abstraction," in *Mute,* accessed June 15, 2014, http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/wandering-abstraction.

[10] Endnotes, "What are We to Do," http://libcom.org/library/what-are-we-do-endnotes.

[11] "A theory which sets out from the self-reproduction of the social totality in the abstract can only express the existence of this totality tautologically: the persistence of the parts is functionally necessary for the persistence of the whole, and the persistence of the whole is nothing but the persistence of these functional parts. The Althusserian notion of "structural causality" takes this tautology for a metaphysical principle — a mistake inseparable from the functionalist tendency within Althusserian Marxism." Endnotes, "Crisis in the Class Relation," accessed June 15, 2014, http://endnotes.org.uk/articles/2.

[12] "The most aberrant contemporary example of the external application of a 'method' (which in its 'universality' is following fashion) to any object whatsoever is 'structuralism'." Althusser, *Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists,* 97.

[13] Althusser, "Letter to Mauricio Malamud," in *Philosophy of the Encounter*, 210-11.

[14] Althusser, *The Specter of Hegel,* trans. G.M. Goshgarian, ed. Francois Matheron (London: Verso, 1997), 149. The translator also makes this useful following note: "The title of this section, *La bonne contenance,* is an untranslatable pun. *Bonne* means 'good'. *Contenance* means 'contents' in the sense of 'capacity', 'volume', but also 'countenance' in the sense of demeanour; whence *faire bonne contenance,* 'to put up a good front'.", 140.

[15] Althusser, *Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists,* 143.

[16] "conceptual intervention is hardly the stuff of revolutions, at least not for Marxists", Brassier, "Wandering Abstraction".

[17] Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," accessed June 14, 2014, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm

[18] Louis Althusser, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism,* trans. G.M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2013), 51 n. 6.

[19] Gilles Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control," in *Desert Islands: and Other Texts, 1953-1974* (Semiotext(e), 2004).

[20] See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, "On the Geology of Morals" and "The Smooth and the Striated," in *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minnesota, 1987), Deleuze describes modulation as a sieve in his "Postscript on the Societies of Control": "like a self-deforming cast that will continually change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point."

[21] Pierre Macherey, "Two Figures of Interpellation," in *Radical Philosophy,* trans. Z.L. Fraser (March, 2012).

[22] Louis Althusser, *Writings on Psychoanalysis: Freud and Lacan,* eds. Olivier Corpet and Francois Matheron, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman (NY: Columbia, 1996), 156.

23 Benedict Singleton, "Maximum Jailbreak," *e-flux,* http://www.e-flux.com/journal/maximum-jailbreak/. An extended version of this essay can also be found in *#Accelerate: The Accelerationis Reader* (Urbanomic/Merve Verlag, 2014)

24 Ray Brassier, *Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction,* (Palgrave Macmillian, 2010), 48.

25 "No matter how originary and precursory a trauma is, there is still another trauma to which it can be deepened, another trauma by which the infinite inter-connected traumas can be widened — it is the one that makes sure the narcissistic wound keeps bleeding."Reza Negarestani, "Globe of Revolution: An Afterthought on Geophilosophical Realism," in *Identities* 17, 2011 (Euro-Balkan Institute).

26 "What does the concept of structural causality mean? It signifies (in crude terms) that an effect B (considered as an element) is not the effect of a cause A (another element), but is instead the effect of element A insofar as this element A is inserted into relations that constitute the structure in which A is situated [and caught up]. This means, in simple terms, that in order to comprehend the production of effect B, it is not enough to consider cause A (immediately preceding, or visibly related with effect B) in an isolated manner, but cause A instead as an element of a structure in which it assumes a place, therefore as subject to relations, specific structural relations, that define the structure in question. A very basic form of structural causality appears in modern physics, when it uses the concept of a field [champ], and puts into play what can be called the causality of a field." Louis Althusser, "On Genesis," in *Decalages,* trans. Jason Smith, accessed June 15, 2014, http://scholar.oxy.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=decalages

27 Louis Althusser, "Notes on a Materialist Theater," accessed June 15, 2014, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1962/materialist-theatre.htm

28 Deleuze & Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 73.

29 Sigmund Freud, in Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud, *Studies on Hysteria,* trans. and ed. James Strachey (Basic, 2000), 264.

30 Louis Althusser, *Machiavelli and Us,* ed. Francois Matheron, trans. Gregory Elliot (London: Verso, 1999), 57.

31 Louis Althusser, "L'unique tradition materialiste," Lignes 18 (1993): 85-86. Cited in Warren Montag, "The Soul is the Prison of the Body: Althusser and Foucault, 1970-1975," *Yale French Studies*, No. 88, Depositions: Althusser, Balibar, Macherey, and the Labor of Reading (1995), 53-77. The fortress, as Althusser remarks in *Machiavelli and Us*, is "a monument not to architecture but to political error. Castles of brick and iron are dangerous expedients", 83.

32 Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society* (Harvester Press, 1978), 7.

33 Detienne and Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society,* 42-3.

34See Francois Jullien, *Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking,* trans. Janet Lloyd (Hawaii, 2004).

[35] "these reversals are in fact encroachments, that is to say, positions gained on the adversary's. That is why any philosophy, idealist or materialist, contains its opposite, *its enemy*: it is by besieging the enemy, by encroaching on him—on his position—that a philosophy can hope to prevail over its enemy. If it is true that the adversary's positions are occupied in this way, it is not surprising that a philosophy should contain—but *occupied in its fashion*—what we have referred to as the adversary's positions. It is not surprising that each philosophy *must* (this is an effect of the war between philosophies, between philosophical tendencies) strive to occupy the adversary's positions, the adversary's theses, inside itself. Partially or wholly." Althusser, "Correspondence about 'Philosophy and Marxism'," in *Philosophy of the Encounter,* 223-4.

[36] Althusser, *The Specter of Hegel,* 37.

[37] Althusser, *Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists,* 116.

[38] Althusser often makes reference to philosophy's war and to the Kantian Kampfplatz, but gives a very precise image of how this is implicated in his work in the following passage from *Essays in Self-Criticism*: "A philosophy does not make its appearance in the world as Minerva appeared to the society of Gods and men. It only exists in so far as it occupies a position, and it only occupies this position in so far as it has conquered it in the thick of an already occupied world. It therefore only exists in so far as this conflict has made it something distinct, and this distinctive character can only be won and imposed in an indirect way, by a detour involving ceaseless study of other, existing positions. This detour is the form of the conflict which determines what sid a philosophy takes in the battle and on the "Kampfplatz" (Kant), the battlefield which is philosophy. Because if the philosophy of philosophers is this perpetual war (to which Kant wanted to put an end by introducing the everlasting peace of his own philosophy), then no philosophy can exist within this theoretical relation of force except in so far as it marks itself off from its opponents and lays siege to that part of the positions which they have had to occupy in order to guarantee their power of the enemy whose impress they bear. If—as Hobbes says, speaking perhaps to empty benches, and with reference as much to philosophy as to the society of men—war is a generalized state, and leaves nowhere in the world for a shelter, and if it produces its own condition as its own result, which means that every war is essentially preventive, it is possible to understand that the war of philosophies, in which systems come into conflict, presupposes the *preventive* strike of positions against one another, and thus the necessary use by a philosophy of a detour *via* other philosophies in order to define and defend its own position." Louis Althuuser, *Essays in Self-Criticism*, trans Grahame Lock (NLB, 1976) 165-6.

[39] Althusser and Balibar, *Reading Capital,* 42. The myth of the absolute subject might also be compared with Wilfred Sellars and the manifest vs. the scientific image of man.

[40] Althusser, *Philosophy of the Encounter,* 216-7.

[41] Althusser, *Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists,* 124-5.

[42] Detienne and Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society,* 7. Althusser was highly critical of Schelling's notion of 'poles', however the analysis of Gilles Chatelet on this point is worth considering. See Gilles Chatelet, *Figuring Space: Philosophy, Mathematics, and Physics,* trans. Robert Shore and Muriel Zagha (Springer, 2000).

[43] Althusser, *Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists*, 250.

[44] Althusser, *Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists*, 48-9.

[45] Althusser, *Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists*, 252.

[46] Althusser, *Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists*, 97.

[47] Or what Giorgio Agamben will call "a pure activity of government that aims at nothing other than its own replication", *What is an Apparatus,* trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (California: Stanford, 2009), 10.

[48] Agamben, *What is an Apparatus,* 14.

[49] Detienne and Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society,* 140-2.

[50] Detienne and Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society,* 23, n.11.

[51] Detienne and Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society,* 43.

[52] Althusser, *Machiavelli and Us*, 95.

[53] Althusser, *Machiavelli and Us*, 96.

[54] Althusser, *Machiavelli and Us*, 121-2.

[55] Jullien, *Treatise on Efficacy,* 69.

[56] Louis Althusser, *The Humanist Controversy and Other Writings,* ed. Francois Matheron, trans. G.M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2003), 276.

[57] Althusser, *The Humanist Controversy and Other Writings,* 276.

[58] Althusser and Balibar, *Reading Capital,* 19-26.

[59] Althusser and Balibar, *Reading Capital,* 24-9.

[60] Pierre Macherey, *In a Materialist Way,* trans. Ted Stolze, ed. Warren Montag (London: Verso, 1998), 56.

[61] Althusser, *Writings on Psychoanalysis,* 101.

[62] Jullien, *Treatise on Efficacy*.

[63] Bertold Brecht, *The Tulane Drama Review* Vol. 6, No. 1 (Sep., 1961), pp. 130-136.

[64] Alain Badiou, "The Autonomy of the Aesthetic Process," trans. Bruno Bosteels in *Radical Philosophy 178* (March/April 2013).

[65] Badiou, "The Autonomy of the Aesthetic Process".

[66] Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays,* trans. Ben Brewster (London: Monthly Review, 1971), 238-9.

[67] The notion of an artistic configuration might be compared to Jullien's understanding of a configuration or situation, where he states that it is not "a frame into which the subject's action inserts itself or the ambience in which he or she exercises his or her capacities. It cannot be limited to something that incorporates the subject and sets off his or her qualities. It is neither a screen (onto which his or her faculties can be projected), nor is it a setting." Jullien, *Treatise on Efficacy,* 188.

[68] c.f. Magnani, *Model Based Reasoning in Science and Technology: Abduction, Logic, and Computational Discovery* (Springer, 2010). The notion of abductive reasoning is also being explored in the neo-rationalist work of Reza Negarestani. I have considered its relation to

artistic procedures and methods of formalization in "Ontological Pivots," *Design Ecologies 2.2* (Intellect, 2012).

[69] Macherey, "Philosophy as Operation," 32.

[70] Macherey, "Philosophy as Operation," 33.

[71] Macherey, "Philosophy as Operation," 34.

[72] Macherey, "Philosophy as Operation," 34.

[73] Macherey, "Philosophy as Operation," 34.

[74] Althusser, *Philosophy of the Encounter*, 205 n.24.

[75] Macherey, "Spinoza and the End of History", in *In a Materialist Way,* 157.

[76] Francois Matheron, "Louis Althusser, or the Impure Purity of the Concept," in *Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism,* ed. Jaques Bidet (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 517. Aside from Francois Matheron, we could look to Ray Brassier to supplement this: "Thus mimetic phenomena are double-edged: mimicry is at once a defense mechanism and a weapon. It is exemplified not only by the prey's miming of the inorganic in order to evade the predator, but also by the predator's miming of its prey. But its ambiguity goes deeper: for it is the defense mechanism itself which converts into a weapon - the repression which served to preserve the organic individual against the threat of inorganic dissolution becomes its fundamental weapon against nature, whether organic or inorganic. Mimetic sacrifice effectuates a reversibility between the threatening power which is to be warded off, and the threatened entity which seeks to defend itself through sacrifice." Brassier, *Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction* (Palgrave Macmillian, 2010), 46.

[77] Balibar, "Althusser's Object"

[78] Macherey, "Philosophy as Operation" *In a Materialist Way,* p.*36*

[79] Macherey, "Toward a Theory of Literary Production", ibid. p.47

[80] "Francastel's *rele* (from the French *relais*, meaning 'relay') affords - for the work of art - another mixture or junction of great value; one where the perceived, the real and the imaginary are conjugated. 'The plastic sign, by being a place where elements proceeding from these three categories encounter and interfere with one another, is neither expressive (imaginary and individual) nor representative (real and imaginary), but also figurative (unity of the laws of the brain's optical activity and those of the techniques of elaboration of the sign as such).' (P. Francastel, *La realidad figurative* [1965] [Barcelona: Paidos, 1988], 115). If we contrast a definition of the work of art as a 'form that signifies itself' (Focillon) with a definition of the work of mathematics as a 'structure that forms itself' (our extrapolation, motivated by Lautman), we can have some intuition, once again, of the deep common ground underlying aesthetics and mathematics." Fernando Zalamea, *Synthetic Philosophy of Contemporary Mathematics,* trans. Z.L. Fraser (Urbanomic/Sequence, 2013), 61.

[81] Macherey, "Toward a Theory of Literary Production", in *In a Materialist Way,* 49.

[82] Pierre Macherey, *A Theory of Literary Production* (Routledge, 2006), 296. "like every other object, including instruments of production and knowledge, or even the corpus of the sciences, a work of art can become an *element* of the *ideological*, i.e. it can be

inserted into the system of relations which constitute the ideological" Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy,* 241.

83 Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy*.

84 "The function of imagination is to generate catastrophes for thinking, and the function of thought with regard to imagination is to escape the limits of imagination. The feedback loop between rational thinking and imagination is what highlights the ways out and inspires new modes of action or the grasping of opportunities outside of the immediate resources and opportunities of the here and now. " Reza Negarestani, "The Human Centipede: A View From the Artworld", unpublished paper.

85 Althusser, *Philosophy of the Encounter,* 206 n.51.

86 Althusser's thesis gives some indication as to how the notion of the grip and the fall relate to each other, from the early "Hegelian Althusser". Translator's notes appear in brackets: "The 'revelation of depth' mentioned in ch. 8 of the *Phenomenology* commences with the Fall. It is Hegel's merit to have sensed this depth and grasped it in thought. This extraordinary accomplishment has, perhaps, no equivalent apart from the capture of depth in Cezanne's painting. The fisherman of the Enlightenment fished the way others paint, on the surface. Hegel fished the bottom —he took the whole sea, the depth of the sea, in his nets. The sense [*sens,* which means both 'meaning' and 'direction'] of the Fall also teaches us that there is no depth other than the one we fall into ourselves, and that truth is only given to those who grasp it and allow themselves to be taken in its grasp [the double sense of 'grasp' may give some idea of Althusser's pun here: *celui qui la prend,* which means 'he who takes it', is pronounced exactly like *celui qui l'apprend,* 'he who learns it']. Therein lies the lesson of the concept." Althusser, *The Specter of Hegel,* 161 n.79.

87 Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Inhuman* (California: Stanford, 1991), 15.

88 "Even when they are caught animals may, thanks to their mêtis, themselves remain traps" Detienne and Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society,* 33.

89 Althusser and Balibar, *Reading Capital,* 56.

90 Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control".

91 Suhail Malik and Andrea Phillips, "Tainted Love: Art's Ethos and Capitalization".

92 Zalamea, *Synthetic Philosophy of Contemporary Mathematics,* 145-56.

93 Gabriel Catren, "On Philosophical Alchimery," in *Collapse: Philosophical Research and Development, Vol. VII*, eds. Reza Negarestani and Robin Mackay (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2011), 361-7. See also "Translation: the Philosopher's Task", interview with Gabriel Catren, accessed June 15, 2014, http://ifverso.com/en/node/628253

94 Jullien, *Treatise on Efficacy*, 48

95 Althusser, *The Humanist Controversy and Other Writings, 271-2.*

96 Althusser, *Philosophy of the Encounter,* 178. Althusser will also relate this capacity of theatrical counter-interpellation to shatter the ideological bond in his essay on materialist theater: "Will it put this infinite mirror at the centre of the action? Or will it rather displace it, put it to one side, find it and lose it, leave it, return to it, expose it from afar to forces which are external – and so drawn out – that like those wine-glasses broken at a distance

by a physical resonance, it comes to a sudden end as a heap of splinters on the floor." Althusser, "Notes on a Materialist Theater".

[97] Althusser, *Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists,* 134.

[98] "The fact is that we have to do with this world and not another. The fact is that this world 'plays by the rules' (in the sense in which one says that an honest player does: for this world plays, and - no mistake about it - plays with us), that it is subject to rules and obeys laws." Althusser, *Philosophy of the Encounter*, 195.

[99] Recent video talk on the Accelerate manifesto through the Global Center for Advance Studies, accessed June 15, 2014, http://www.globaladvancedstudies.org/2014/03/gcas-youtube-live.html

[100] Louis Althusser,"Contradiction and Overdetermination," accessed June 15, 2014, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1962/overdetermination.htm

[101] Detienne and Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society,* 107.

[102] Detienne and Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society,* 152.

[103] "no determination of these elements can be assigned except by *working backwards* from the result to its becoming, in its retroaction. If we must therefore say that there can be no result without its becoming (Hegel), we must also affirm that there is nothing which has become except as determined by the result of this becoming — this retroaction itself (Canguilhem). That is, instead of thinking contingency as a modality of necessity, or an exception to it, we must think necessity as the becoming-necessary of the encounter of contingencies." Althusser, *Philosophy of the Encounter,* 193-4.

[104] Detienne and Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society,* 224-5.

[105] Althusser, *The Specter of Hegel,* 165 n.138.